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Abstract. 
This article analyses the growth of microfinance by examining how some driven forces heighten 
more or less their financial integration. Three main driven forces identify: agency costs, 
financial development and trade-off in microfinance. The author samples 542 microfinance 
institutions. Quantile regression applies to analyze difference effects. The results first reveal 
that high financial development can easily improve financial integration of microfinance, by 
expanding rate of external investors. Nevertheless, as viewed, high financial integration can 
also reach where financial development is low. Then, there is inverse link between agency costs 
and financial integration of MFIs. At last outreach performs better than financial performance 
in improving their financial integration. There is no mission drift across quantiles and status. 
Microfinance institutions that plan to increase their average loans with an increase of their 
number of active borrowers perform better in a financial integration. 
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1. Introduction 
The microfinance has developed during this last three decades. Its success is partly 
because of two mains observations. One is the ability of microfinance institutions to reach the 
poor's (Littlefield, Morduch, et Hashemi 2003; Hartarska et Nadolnyak 2008; Rai et Ravi 2011). 
This improves financial inclusion rate in less developed countries. Some pessimistic views 
argue there is neither real effect, nor the effect of microfinance on poverty is not clear (Kah, 
Olds, et Kah 2005; Morris et Barnes 2005; Bateman 2010; Duflo 2010). Nevertheless, despite 
this debate, the importance of microfinance actions in less developed countries is real.  
The second is a raise of external funds in microfinance industry. It explains rapid growth 
of some microfinance institutions (Ghosh et al. 2003). The cost of external funds because of 
their origins (domestic and international) settles the efficiency of microfinance institutions. 
Cheap external funds impel low loan costs that expand microfinance. Efficient microfinance 
institutions can attract more poor clients. Reverse effects occur with entry of inefficient 
microfinance institutions that benefit from low costs of external funds. In this case, an increase 
of external funds cost could lessen the inefficient MFIs, but there could be a raise of loans 
interest rate linked to an increase of external funds cost.  
So, an increase of microfinance is real through financial integration set up with external 
investors. External investors in microfinance industry are commercials banks, foreign banks, 
venture capitalists and private investors. External investors taking part in capital improve the 
microfinance institutions financing sources. The neoclassical theory argues that growth of 
microfinance explained by a financial integration occurred between microfinance institutions 
and external investors (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009 P. 182). Contributing this paper is to 
identify and analyze the impact of driven forces that can heighten more or less microfinance 
financial integration based on an increase of external funds. 
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As the financial theory stated, setting up financial integration by two main control 
reasons namely an increase of the degree of financial development and decrease of agency 
costs. Let argue that a high financial development encourages financial integration. If the 
financial development degree is low, only larger firms will be more financially integrated, 
because they will be able to bear high markets and contractual costs (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
Microfinance institutions with specific behavior could impel some mission drifts. They could 
increase moral hazard incentives that highlights trade-off between financial performance and 
outreach. Purpose of considering trade-off in microfinance, explains its impact on financial 
integration. So, in this study we consider three main driven forces that can impact microfinance 
financial integration. They are: financial development, agency costs and trade-off between 
financial performance and outreach. The study evaluates driven forces impact on financial 
integration of microfinance.  
It samples 542 microfinance institutions between 1997 to 2013. Quantile regression 
applies to analyze difference effects. The results first reveal that high financial development 
can easily improve financial integration of microfinance, by expanding rate of external 
investors. Nevertheless, as viewed, high financial integration can also reach where financial 
development is low. One reason gave is that only larger microfinance institutions with highest 
market share can be easily financially integrated. There is inverse link between agency costs 
and financial integration of microfinance institutions. At last, outreach performs better than 
financial performance in improving their financial integration. There is no mission drift across 
quantiles and status. Microfinance institutions that plan to increase their average loans with an 
increase of their number of active borrowers perform better in a financial integration. 
Rest of article is as follows. The second section examines the literature linking the 
financial integration with financial development, agency cost and trade-off between outreach 
and financial performance. The third section presents the data, model and estimation methods. 
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The fourth section discusses the empirical results, and presents some robustness checks of the 
results. The fifth section ends with important implications. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Financial integration and financial development 
Financial development has an important role in improving financial services in an 
economy.Financial development includes its ability to mobilize private savings, effective 
resource allocation, increasing liquidity risk diversification, reducing information asymmetries 
and transaction costs, and improving alternative funds through individuals’ household savings 
and undistributed corporate profits (Ang and Mackibbing, 2005).  
 Low financial development could weaken financial links between microfinance 
institutions and external investors. Most developing countries have low financial development. 
There are also large market gaps existing between microfinance institutions and commercial 
banks (Vanroose et D’Espallier 2013). A solution is to improve financial sources of 
microfinance by encouraging new financial opportunities. So, financial integration improves 
by financial development rise financial inclusion rate through an increase of clients and 
products portfolio. The gains of financial integration in microfinance are transfer of banking 
practices, technology, skills and funds. An increase of external funds flows lessens the cost of 
capital and increases microfinance savings (Prasad et al. 2007). External investors having good 
arbitrage strategy between risk and returns, will easily manage microfinance risks. Similarly, 
microfinance easily share their experience to external investors by teaching them how to finance 
and include poor clients, small and precarious entrepreneurs in the financial sector.  
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External investors taking part in microfinance capital could gain extra returns coming 
from social advantages and improvement of regulation. Some external investors could more 
focus on increasing of funds granted to poor, small and medium firms. Based on this, let assume 
that financial development is positively linked to financial integration of microfinance. External 
investors will be more confident about microfinance institutions capability and skills. They will 
have high incentives to diversify their portfolio with some new financial and social investment. 
The first assumption is -H.1 a positive effect of financial development on financial integration 
of microfinance-. 
 
2.2 Financial integration and agency cost 
Financial institution deciding to open their capital to external investors faces agency 
costs. Agency costs highlight some conflicts between the manager and shareholders. Agency 
costs in microfinance growth is the conflict between managers’ objectives and pressure of 
external investors. External investors can put pressure to guide loans granted with as result an 
increase of default risk of borrowers. As the agency cost theory mentioned, the internal 
organization depends on institutional characteristics value by the capital (Williamson 2000).  
The value of capital measured by equity/assets (Berger et Di Patti 2006). Low 
equity/assets or high leverage ratio lessens agency costs and increases firm value. This is real 
if external investors can easily encourage or constrain manager’s decisions to act more in their 
interests (Berger et Di Patti 2006). So, the existing link between financial integration and 
equity/assets is negative. As microfinance institutions financially integrate, they easily lessen 
the agency cost by well diversifying their capital. Microfinance institutions with high returns 
will also more attracting external investors because they appear as more confident in the market.  
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Low agency cost means high leverage ratio for financial institutions. Sometimes, high 
leverage ratio can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers about specifics points. 
Those points are investment strategies (Myers 1977), risk (Jensen et Meckling 1976; Williams 
1987), liquidation conditions and dividend policy (Stulz 1990). Later, Kar in 2012 analyzes the 
impact of capital and financing structure on microfinance performance. He empirically 
confirms agency cost theory by specifying an increase in leverage that raises profit efficiency 
(Kar 2012). He argues that capital/assets negatively linked financial performance. There is a 
nonlinear relationship between capital/assets and financial performance of microfinance. An 
increase in debt/equity associates with a decrease in profitability (Kar, 2012 P.340).   
Indeed, one important point that appears clearly in those studies is that a well-diversified 
capital of financial institutions characterizes by low agency cost. So we assume at this stage 
that -H2. there is a negative relationship between agency costs and financial integration degree-
. 
2.3 Financial integration and trade-off between financial performance and 
outreach 
Financial integration is part of financial development mainly characterized by an 
increase of financial inclusion rate in less developed countries. To insure sustainable financial 
integration of microfinance, it is important to consider their financing ability and social 
strategies. Besides, an improvement of micro financial intermediation is real with good 
regulation and supervision. These good regulation and supervision can also impact the financial 
integration.  
Good or weak macroeconomic environment impacts microfinance growth (Gonzalez 
2007; Krauss et Walter 2009; Ahlin, Lin, et Maio 2011). This will in their turn impact financial 
integration of microfinance. In less developed financial sector, microfinance more targets poor 
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clients and raise the rate of financial inclusion (Vanroose and D’espallier 2013, P. 1966). In a 
well-developed financial sector, microfinance institutions will compete with banks that could 
easily adapt their loans contracts. This competition pressure can lead to mission drift in the 
microfinance clients’ portfolio. Mission drift occurs when the size of average loans increases 
(Mersland and Strom, 2010 P. 29). Microfinance will increasingly choose to target better-off 
clients as a reply to aggressive actions of banks in the market. Existence of mission drift is also 
determined by microfinance experience (Mersland and Strom, 2010 P. 30), maturity of clients 
Cull et al. 2009, P. F126) and microfinance efficiency (Hermes, Lensink, et Meesters 2009). 
By considering these facts, a high mission drift is positively linked to a high-level of 
financial development. One aim in this case for microfinance is to diversified their clients’ 
portfolio by targeting better-off clients.  A high mission drift also highlights an event of trade-
off between financial performance and outreach. So, MFIs increase their financial performance 
by diversifying their clients’ portfolio by targeting of better-off clients. So, let assume -H3. an 
indirect and positive link between mission drift and financial integration.  
 
3. Method 
3.1 Data 
To carry out our tests, the study uses a panel dataset on 542 microfinance institutions 
from Mix-market database merge with country-level economic data of World Bank data from 
1997 to 2013. Each microfinance institution has a minimum of 10 years to a maximum of 17 
years’ observations. The criteria defining our panel dataset needs that all microfinance have at 
least a minimum of 10 observations on the length period of 17 years considered. The dataset 
includes microfinance institutions of five sub-regions: Sub-Saharan Africa (98 MFIs), East Asia 
and Pacific (50 MFIs), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (103 MFIs), Latin America and 
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Caribbean (181 MFIs), South Asia (79 MFIs) and Middle East and North Africa (31 MFIs). 
The panel dataset analysis organizes on individual microfinance profile.  
A classification of microfinance institutions does by the degree of financial integration 
(each quantile). To make our results robust, we divide our sample in five subsamples based on 
the status of microfinance. Microfinance status are banks, credit and saving cooperatives, 
nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and rural 
banks. This sample as the one of Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013, P. 1969) cannot claim as a 
representative data of the whole microfinance sector. Our aim by building this database is to 
more diversify endogenous characteristics of microfinance. 
 
3.2 Variables 
(a) Dependent variable: Financial integration 
The degree of financial openness measures financial integration.  Prasad et al. 2007 
identify two index. The first one is official controls on capital flows consider as a binary 
indicator that directly measures the capital controls but does not capture differences in the 
intensity of these controls. Capital account controls highlight some constrained measures took 
to control capital flow. The second one is to estimated gross stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). The both measures value the financial 
openness of an economy. 
Giannetti and Ongena (2009) evaluate the impact of financial integration on firm 
performance by considering the rate foreign lending in the gross loan portfolio. As a financial 
integration measure they used the percentage of foreign lending which is a ratio of foreign banks 
loans to total banks loans. In Mixmarket database we cannot distinguished foreign loans to 
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domestic loans in the grow loans portfolio. But according to the literature review above, a proxy 
of financial integration is the level external funds compare with total financing sources.  
For example, an analysis of Kenyan microfinance sector shows the importance of debt 
funds rate to the deposits and compulsory savings2.  As already mentioned, financial integration 
in microfinance considers participation of external investors in the capital. For that, let 
identified five subgroups of capital sources: Domestic debt, international debt, compulsory 
savings, deposits collected and equity.  
Annual reports of Kenyan microfinance in 2012, 2013 and 2014 consider three types of 
microfinance institutions. There are, microfinance that gives only credit financed by 
borrowings, microfinance banks and banks mainly financed by borrowings, deposits and equity. 
If we exclude banks, only two important sources remain which are deposits and borrowings. 
Between 2012 and 2014, liabilities increase for whole Kenyan microfinance actors. For debt 
funds, an increase is just for microfinance given only credit and banks. The debt funds of 
microfinance increases between 2011 and 2012 and decrease in 2013. 
Different observations appear for financial integration analysis according to 
microfinance status. Microfinance that gives only credit with high rate of international debt 
register a slowdown of their financial performance. The slowdown expresses a decline of 
returns and operational self-sufficiency. Managing international debt without deposits and with 
equity and compulsory savings is not enough. Besides, some microfinance institutions that 
gives only credit have domestic debt, compulsory savings and equity greater than external 
debts. They register better results with a raise of their financial performance. As example, those 
microfinances are Jitegemea Credit Scheme, SISDO and JEHU microfinance. For microfinance 
                                                          
2 The study case of financial integration analysis is the Kenya microfinance sector did through the reports of 22 
MFIs among which 3 of them are largest and having 80% of the market share. Among those MFIs 13 are considered 
as only given credits, 6 are microfinance banks that collect deposits and give credit and 3 are banks. 
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banks, their capital is more diverse with domestic debt and international debt that are less 
important than compulsory savings and deposits. A good financial integration is real for 
microfinance if total savings is greater than debt funding. The success of their financial 
integration insures an equilibrium between external funds, domestic savings and equity. 
Therefore, their financial performance indicators are positive.  This specific result contributes 
to consider the percentage of borrowing as a proxy measure of financial integration calculate 
as the ratio of total borrowing over total funds (total deposits plus total borrowings).  The 
microfinance financial integration index is defined as follows: 
 
	

	  		

 
Let consider the graph 1 below that shows the different stage of financial integration of 
a microfinance institution. 
[Insert graph 1] 
Graph 1 shows the financial integration level measures as the percentage of borrowings to total 
funds. The graph shows three part for the financial integration curve. The first one where 
financial integration curve is nearest 0. The second part where the financial integration curve is 
between 0 and 1. The last part where the financial integration curve is nearest 1.  This can be 
resume by the line below. 
 
 
The value of financial integration indicator of microfinance is between 0 and 1.  
If FI = 0, there is no financial integration, this means the main and only financing sources for 
microfinance is total deposits collected. 
1 0.5 0 
Full financial 
integration 
High financial 
integration 
None 
financial 
integration 
Less financial 
integration 
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 If FI = 1, there is full integration, and external funds as borrowings mainly finance 
microfinance loans granted. 
(b) Variables of interest 
i. Financial development 
The data source of financial development indicators is World Bank Indicators (WBI) 
database. Three probable measures analyze the financial development process. They are the 
domestic credit provided by the financial sector (DC_FS), Automated teller machines (ATM) 
and interest rate spread (spread). The one consider in our study is domestic credit provided by 
financial sector. 
ii. Leverage effects 
One measure of agency cost is equity/assets. Equity/assets is a measure of leverage for 
firms. There is an inverse relation between equity/assets and leverage. If leverage effects are 
high, then equity/assets will be low. This induces low agency cost linked to high leverage ratio. 
iii. Financial performance 
Financial performance and outreach are indicators that analyze microfinance 
performance. To measure financial performance, Mixmarket proposes four indicators. They are 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and operational 
self-sufficiency (OSS). FSS and OSS measure ability of microfinance to cover their cost (Kar, 
2012 P.331). ROE and ROA measure ability of microfinance to make returns (Hartarska 2005). 
This study considers two indicators of financial performance ROA and OSS. Return on assets 
(ROA) equals to net operating income, less taxes on assets. Most microfinance clearly values 
their return on assets more than return on equity. Equity is ambiguous with mix value of real 
equity owned and subsidies received.  
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The second group of dependent variables is outreach where we distinguish breadth of 
outreach to depth of outreach (Cull et al. 2011; Kar 2012). Breadth of outreach measure the 
number of active clients (Cull, Morduch, et others 2007); Kar 2012 P.332). Depth of outreach 
evaluates the quality of outreach to poor. Its associated indicators are average loans, average 
loan amount adjusted by GNI per capita and percent of female loan clients. 
(c) Control variables 
i. Microfinance institutions’ control variables 
The microfinance control variables are size, financial intermediation degree and status. 
The assets per GNI measures the microfinance institutions size. Graph 2 below shows the 
relationship between assets growth and borrowings. There is a positive correlation between 
assets growth and percentage of borrowings. Large microfinance institutions more use external 
funds than small ones. 
[Insert graph 2] 
As graph 2 suggests, the more borrowings increase, the more assets raise. Just a few 
part of large microfinance borrows high amounts, a huge number of small size used less external 
funds.  
The financial intermediation measures microfinance ability to collect deposits that 
finance loans granted. So, if a microfinance collects high deposits, then its level of financial 
intermediation is high. Thus, financial intermediation here is a dummy variable; with 1 if a 
microfinance has a high financial intermediation and 0 otherwise. The legal type of 
microfinance considered are four (BANK, COOP, NBFI and NGO).  
ii. Macroeconomic environment 
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For the macroeconomic environment, we consider six factors which are: GDP per capita 
growth, remittances received (REMI) and aid received (AID).  Their values are extracting from 
WDI data base. Economic growth measures by GDP per capita growth (GDPPC) indicates 
dynamic changes in real GDP divided by the population. As financial development-economic 
growth link theory reveals, a high financial development is positively link to a high economic 
growth level (King and Levine, 1993).  
Its related observation is extracting from World Bank indicators (WDI) data base. 
Remittances could raise financial inclusion and financial performance of microfinance in 
developing countries. So, an expecting sign is a positive link between remittances and 
microfinance performance. But a negative link between remittances and financial integration. 
Net official aid (AID) refers to aid flows (net of repayments) from official donors to countries 
and territories.  
 
3.3 Models and estimation methods 
The regression model in outspoken form is: 
  ()  
()  
()  ℎ(  )  !(" )     #   (1) 
i is for microfinance and t for time. FI is for financial integration. FD is for financial 
development.   is a vector of microfinance performance (social and financial).  is for 
leverage and is negatively linked to cost agency.    is a set of institution-specific 
variable "  includes a set of macro-economic control variables for the country. The 
empirical model valued for financial integration as dependent variables $ is as follows: 
$   %& +   + #          = 1,2, … . . , ,  (2) 
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& is a 1XK vectors of observable variables for microfinance “I” at time “t”.   is 
unobservable effect considered sometimes as unobserved component, latent variable, or 
unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010, P.251). If i referred to individual, then   is 
individual’s effects or individual heterogeneity. # represents idiosyncratic errors or 
idiosyncratic disturbances related to variations across t and i. Many financial behavior studies 
rely on performance indicators with unobserved effects interacting with explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2010 P. 299).  
What’s more, microfinance empirical studies apply methods as ordinary least squares 
(OLS), general least square (GLS) or general method of moments (GMM). Those methods 
highlight mean effects and don’t consider distributional effects. However, financial integration 
distributional graph (graph 3) below shows important changes along the pathway. Despite 
general increase of financial integration (see graph 3), there are differences across quantiles.  
[Insert graph 3] 
Thus, we use quantile regression that considers those limits that can influence our panel 
data specification. This allows us to highlight the effects of independent variables X along the 
entire distribution. A basic approach developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) relies on 
quantile parameter heterogeneity. One of their main hypothesis is that control variable effects 
is exogenous. But as we can note in our study financial intermediation is endogenous to 
financial integration. Koenker and Bassett (1978) quantile regression shows some limits. 
Standard errors estimated are not consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, 
quantile regression estimators in this case are biased. One solution is to estimate a conditional 
quantile regression. By this method, main control variable is modeled as endogenous variable. 
For that Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) developed an approach based on instrumental 
variable (IV) identification strategy (Frölich and Melly, 2010, P.4). 
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So, the analysis of the driven forces impacts on financial integration will consider a 
conditional quantile for our panel data. Their results will be compare to those of general least 
square (GLS). The first step of our analysis will be a Hausman test where different coefficient 
parameters will be estimated. It will find out probable fixed effects across quantiles or not. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive facts 
[Insert table 1] 
The cross-regions evidence summaries in table 1 as a comparable analysis of financial 
integration and financial development focuses on analysis of the role of private savings in the 
financial development. Subregions where financial development is low as Africa and East Asia 
and the pacific register also a low financial integration. Nevertheless, there are also subregions 
with low financial development linked to high financial integration. These are the cases of Latin 
America and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Those evidence for 
developing countries reveals two ending remarks about the financial development theory. On 
the one hand as the theory says, less increase of financial products and services can appear as a 
great constrain for a good financial integration. On the other hand, when the financial 
development is low, only larger firms in that economic context are more financially integrated 
as Khanna and Palepu (2000) argued. 
[Insert table 2] 
According to more cross evidence present in table 2, there is another cause that settle a 
high financial integration happening which is the status of financial actors. NGOs and Non-
Banking Financial Institutions (NBFI) are more financially integrated. In Latin America and 
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the Caribbean and Eastern Europe and Central Asia where there is less financial development, 
high financial integration is mainly leaded by NGO and NBFI. 
[Insert graph 4] 
Quantile graph analysis did with graph 4 reveals links between financial integration and 
driven forces. Such driven forces are financial development (dc_fs), agency cost (equity/assets), 
microfinance performance (ROA, OSS, average loan per gross national income (avloan_gni) 
and active borrowers (lnacbor)). Mean curve of financial development shows a positive link 
with financial integration. But in some areas of the curve there is a decrease of financial 
development degree when financial integration converges to full integration. Agency cost curve 
shows some area of increase and other of decrease. In fact, an increase of financial integration 
is due to an alternative increase and decrease of agency costs. Financial performance (ROA) 
positively increase across quantiles of financial integration and is above the mean value. 
An analysis of quantile graph shows two types of behavior for the curves of financial 
development and financial performance. There is an alternative increase and decrease of 
financial integration linked to an increase of financial development. According to the curves of 
outreach (breadth and depth), the first part is decreasing with a reshape point where there is an 
increasing process. If outreach approach is considering, through the different quantile of 
financial integration, there is a decline of the number of active borrowers instead the fact of a 
decreasing value of average deposits. 
[Insert table 3] 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics on both depend and independents variables. 
The mean value of financial integration is 68.757 with a high standard deviation equals to 
36.243. This high value of standard deviation of financial integration suggests a possible 
widespread of financial integration level for the whole developing countries. 
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4.2 Results and discussion 
Table 4 shows main results for financial integration testing predictions for the three 
driven forces considered. The first assumption is a positive relationship between financial 
development and financial integration. The second one is a positive relationship between 
leverage and financial integration. The third one is positive link between mission drift, and 
financial integration. Table 4 shows 3 main columns divided according to each quantile (Q= 
0.1; Q=0.5 and Q=0.9). 
[Insert table 4] 
Let first examines the impact of financial development across the different quantiles. 
Financial development positively and significantly impacts financial integration of MFIs. An 
eased access of credit and deposits services encourages by regulation improvement insure good 
development of financial institutions. Each financial institution easily interacts with others, and 
a direct result is more commercial banks loans for microfinance. The level of liabilities 
increases with the level of borrowings. 
If we consider the effect across the different quantiles, the effect of financial 
development is greater in quantile having higher financial integration. For quantile Q=0.9 the 
financial development effect is 0.388 and for quantiles 0.1 and 0.5 their respective values are 
0.141 and 0.212. An increase of borrowings slowdowns the rate of deposits. This partial 
conclusion appears with financial intermediation signs. The more microfinance institutions 
collect deposits, the more they are financial intermediated. 
Thus an increase of financial integration degree for microfinance is negatively linked to 
the percentage of deposits collected. But, as noted in the applied case of Kenyan microfinance, 
the capital of microfinance growth with an equilibrium percentage sets up between external 
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funds and total deposits. External funds (borrowings) has to increase but less than the total 
deposit, to insure them a good performance. 
Let consider now the leverage effect measures by the percentage of equity to assets. 
Equity/assets is significantly and negatively linked to financial integration. Obviously, a 
decrease of equity to assets equal to a decline of agency cost and inversely to a raise of leverage. 
So, the result show a decrease of agency costs induces an increase of financial integration of 
microfinance. Across the quantiles, the agency costs effects are differently weighted. In model 
(2) reducing agency cost is higher in quantiles 0.1 and 0.5. For quantile Q=0.9, reducing agency 
cost is less important. Thus, microfinance institutions that are less financially integrated needs 
to raise their leverage ratio. This is true because they can reduce their agency costs. 
Next, let analyze the trade-off in microfinance impacts on financial integration. 
Microfinance targeting an increase of returns measures by return on assets (ROA), less 
improves their financial integration. Besides, an analysis across status reveals none significant 
effect. Microfinance targeting a decrease of cost measures by operational self-sufficiency 
(OSS), also less improves their financial integration. As the results show, there is a significant 
and inverse relationship between OSS and financial integration for quantile Q=0.5. the 
associated parameter value is -10.666. 
If microfinance choose to improve outreach, two distinguished effects are depth of 
outreach effect and breadth of outreach effect. As remarked, an increase of average loan induces 
an increase of financial integration level across the quantiles with differentiate associated 
values. Quantile with low financial integration values the impact of average loan is positive. In 
quantile Q = 0.1 its coefficient parameters is equal to 3.045. In quantiles Q=0.5 and Q=0.9 the 
respective parameter values are 2.501 and 2.90. The breadth of outreach measures by the 
number of active clients is nonsignificant for quantiles Q=0.5 and Q=0.9. Only for quantile 
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Q=0.1, there is a significant effect of the number of active clients. An increase of the number 
of active borrowers raises the financial integration of microfinance.  
The increase of average loan is consecutive to an increase of the number of active 
borrowers. So, there is no appearance of mission drift with financial integration. This is real in 
quantile Q=0.1 where microfinance is less financial integrated. Therefore, by considering 
microfinance performance, outreach has great effect on financial integration more than financial 
performance. Microfinance that plans to increase their average loans with an increase of their 
number of active borrowers perform better in a financial integration. 
Robustness check of trade-off impacts is done according to each microfinance status. 
According to results, increasing profit and decreasing costs both improve financial integration 
of credit and savings cooperatives. But, for NBFIs effects are reverse. NBFIs are more 
financially integrated if they don’t focus on profit, but on increasing income that covers their 
cost. So in short, financial integration of NBFIs is improved by minimizing their cost with less 
profit. 
[Insert table 5] 
In addition, an analysis of outreach according to microfinance status as table 5 shows, 
reveals for credit and savings cooperatives a cumulative increase of average loans and number 
of active borrowers. There is no mission drift appearance for cooperatives when they choose to 
be more financially integrated. In the cases of banks and NBFIs, increasing the number of active 
clients raise their financial integration. So, microfinance that attracts new clients send a good 
signal to external investors on their ability to extend their clients’ portfolio. It is good incentive 
for external investors to more invest in their capital. Nevertheless, for NGOs, an increasing of 
the number of active clients does not improve their financial integration. 
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What’s more, let analyze additional significant effects of assets size, economic growth, 
aids and inflation. An increase of assets induces a decline of financial integration in 
microfinance. This fact is significantly true for banks, cooperatives and NBFI. According to the 
robustness check, the assets size of all microfinance are negatively and significantly linked to 
their financial integration level. Nevertheless, an increase of NGOs assets raises their financial 
integration. 
Economic growth has a positive impact on financial integration of microfinance. 
Economic growth increases financial integration in top quantiles Q = 0.5 and 0.9. The highest 
value is in quantile Q = 0.5.  Similarly, increasing aid positively impacts financial integration. 
For less financially integrated microfinance, increasing remittances help them to improve their 
financial integration. Inflation is positively linked to financial integration of microfinance. A 
high consumption price implies high external funds in microfinance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, this study analyses the growth of microfinance by examining how some 
driven forces heighten more or less their financial integration. Three main driven forces 
identify: agency costs, financial development and trade-off in microfinance. There are two 
added values related to this study: an empirical value and a theoretical value. First, most 
currents microfinance analysis used panel data approach with a GLS method applied for fixed 
or random effects. Those methods highlight mean effects and don’t consider distributional 
effects. Thus, the use of quantile regression considers those limits. This allows us to highlight 
different weighted effects of driven forces along the entire distribution of financial integration. 
In an empirical view related to microfinance studies, this is our first added value. So in our 
sample of quantiles we have two groups of observations. One group where microfinance 
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institutions are more financially integrated and another group where they are less financially 
integrated. We saw different weighted impacts of driven forces along the quantiles and 
microfinance status on financial integration degree. 
  The second is on theoretical approach where we also highlight the effect of those driven 
forces on the financial integration. As we argue, the first assumption is a positive relationship 
between financial development and financial integration. The second one is a positive 
relationship between leverage and financial integration. The third one is positive link between 
mission drift, and financial integration. 
The results show first that high financial development can easily improve financial 
integration of microfinance, by expanding rate of external investors. Nevertheless, as viewed, 
high financial integration can also reach where financial development is low. One reason gave 
is that only larger microfinance with highest market share can be easily financially integrated. 
There is inverse link between agency costs and financial integration of microfinance. At last, 
outreach performs better than financial performance in improving their financial integration. 
There is no mission drift across quantiles and status. Microfinance institutions that plan to 
increase their average loans with an increase of their number of active borrowers perform better 
in a financial integration. 
All in all, an improvement of financial integration in microfinance relies on financial 
development, agency cost and outreach. Increasing financial performance of microfinance 
slowdowns their financial integration. For developing countries an environmental context 
where microfinance can easily borrow will improve developing the whole financial sector. Less 
financially integrated microfinance needs the support of policy makers. External investors have 
to manage two problems associated to less financially integrated microfinance. Those problems 
are: adverse selection and moral hazard of microfinance institutions. Policy makers could help 
microfinance as lenders at last resort. This will increase the confident in microfinance and 
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decrease the moral hazard negative effect. One result will be more external investors that raise 
capital of microfinance. Policy makers could also ease formal environment to clear 
microfinance sector. This will appear for external investor as a good signal to choose efficient 
project where to invest. Thus, this action will lessen adverse selection problem managing by 
external investors. 
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Table 1. Mean of financial integration and financial development by sub-regions in 
developing countries 
 
Sub-regions Mean Standard Errors 95% Conf.  
Interval 
 
 
 
 
 
FI 
Africa 39.172 1.206 36.807 41.537 
Middle East and North Africa 98.219 0.876 96.503 99.936 
East Asia and the pacific 54.548 1.652 51.309 57.787 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
82.133 1.124 79.929 84.337 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
71.967 0.959 70.087 73.846 
South Asia 75.478 1.137 73.249 77.706 
 
 
 
 
 
FD 
Africa 22.591 0.640 21.336 23.845 
Middle East and North Africa 96.388 2.117 92.237 100.539 
East Asia and the pacific 47.064 1.450 44.221 49.908 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
34.712 0.709 33.322 36.102 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
39.472 0.536 38.421 40.523 
South Asia 56.291 0.578 55.157 57.425 
Source. Author 
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Table 2. Mean of financial integration by Status of MFIs 
 
status Mean Standard 
Error 
95% conf. Interval 
 
 
FI 
bank 42.226 1.259 39.757 44.695 
Cooperatives 29.261 1.615 26.095 32.426 
nbfi 78.903 0.816 77.303 80.503 
ngo 82.001 0.707 80.615 83.387 
Rural Banks 34.781 2.671 29.546 40.017 
others 65.924 7.314 51.584 80.264 
Source. Author 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FI=borrowings/total 
funds 
4278 68.757 36.243 0 100 
fin 8804 0.219 0.413 0 1 
bank 8804 0.133 0.340 0 1 
cooperatives 8804 0.098478 0.298 0.000 1 
nbfi 8804 0.357 0.479 0 1 
ngo 8804 0.376 0.485 0 1 
dc_fs 8603 39.561 25.852 -16.378 195.938 
roa 5478 1.652 10.434 -213.670 100.890 
oss 5975 1.173 0.710 -0.004 36.627 
aloan_gni 6006 0.720 2.073 0 94.712 
acbor 6058 106837.400 498795.200 0 8166287 
equi 6184 34.450 27.166 -156.952 117.266 
lnassets 5494 9.024 1.982 -1.092 15.646 
gdppc_growth 8722 3.352 4.037 -34.960 50.031 
lnremirec 8342 20.739 1.981 9.348 24.971 
lnaid 8498 20.273 0.971 15.384 23.968 
infl_cp 8391 8.669 29.519 -10.067 1058.374 
Source. Author 
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Table 4. Links between financial integration, financial development and microfinance 
performance along the quantiles 
 Q = 0.1 
N = 3230 
Q = 0.5 
N = 3230 
Q = 0.9 
N = 3230 
FI Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
fin -54.966*** 
(6.790) 
-35.070 
(36.330) 
-59.996*** 
(2.166) 
-58.049*** 
(5.262) 
-41.849*** 
(2.166) 
-51.781*** 
(3.906) 
dc_fs 0.171*** 
(0.044) 
0.141*** 
(0.049) 
0.092** 
(0.040) 
0.212*** 
(0.075) 
0.180** 
(0.086) 
0.388*** 
(0.122) 
roa 0.430*** 
(0.153) 
0.291 
(0.252) 
0.205 
(0.165) 
0.303* 
(0.173) 
-0.003 
(0.165) 
0.095 
(0.189) 
oss -0.220 
(1.578) 
-4.356 
(3.813) 
-7.201*** 
(2.091) 
-10.666*** 
(3.005) 
-0.854 
(4.010) 
-7.350*** 
(0.767) 
aloan_gni 2.877 
(1.868) 
3.045*** 
(1.156) 
2.470 
(1.966) 
2.501** 
(1.205) 
1.914** 
(0.765) 
2.900** 
(1.184) 
lnacbor 2.956 
(1.927) 
4.147** 
(1.967) 
2.385 
(1.928) 
2.215 
(2.455) 
0.231 
(0.849) 
-0.354 
(1.596) 
equi -0.657*** 
(0.168) 
-0.568 
(0.478) 
-0.260*** 
(0.091) 
-0.410** 
(0.166) 
-0.102** 
(0.040) 
-0.125 
(0.109) 
lnassets -2.752 
(1.966) 
-3.323 
(2.639) 
-4.768** 
(2.024) 
3.129 
(3.241) 
-2.213** 
(0.958) 
-4.829* 
(-2.540) 
lnassetsB  -7.489** 
(3.251) 
 -15.115*** 
(3.851) 
 -6.368** 
(2.996) 
lnassetsC  0.615 
(2.077) 
 -6.548** 
(2.912) 
 -1.095 
(3.450) 
lnassetsN  -2.608 
(2.433) 
 -8.336** 
(3.986) 
 3.785 
(2.721) 
lnassetsNGO  1.984 
(2.680) 
 -5.056 
(3.248) 
 3.977 
(2.497) 
gdppc_growth 0.185 
(0.31) 
0.316 
(0.220) 
0.357* 
(0.194) 
0.540** 
(0.215) 
0.254** 
(0.117) 
0.394 
(0.251) 
lnremirec 1.7903*** 
(0.552) 
2.015*** 
(0.474) 
1.426 
(0.932) 
1.041 
(0.865) 
-0.188 
(0.724) 
-0.664 
(0.936) 
lnaid -0.9504 
(1.527) 
0.524 
(0.914) 
1.468** 
(0.746) 
2.509*** 
(0.741) 
2.052*** 
(0.561) 
1.761 
(1.165) 
infl_cp 0.4245 
(0.33) 
0.109 
(0.308) 
0.801*** 
(0.215) 
0.434** 
(0.221) 
0.262** 
(0.130) 
0.315 
(0.282) 
bank 2.809 
(4.376) 
98.061*** 
(35.755) 
13.775*** 
(3.301) 
176.202**
* 
(42.469) 
16.821*** 
(4.023) 
105.597*** 
(31.841) 
cooperatives 6.177* 
(3.726) 
-0.384 
(20.397) 
3.090 
(3.648) 
59.350** 
(28.917) 
7.496 
(7.093) 
3.567 
(36.882) 
nbfi 13.4136*** 
(3.147) 
40.806 
(24.746) 
18.653*** 
(3.084) 
94.990** 
(41.443) 
18.037*** 
(3.473) 
-14.431 
(26.509) 
ngo 21.2914*** 
(5.037) 
-0.780 
(24.550) 
30.872*** 
(3.716) 
76.892** 
(32.847) 
21.453*** 
(3.325) 
-9.695 
(23.526) 
_cons 27.2782 
(40.461) 
-25.705 
(37.917) 
36.553 
(23.391) 
-44.859 
(38.320) 
60.905*** 
(22.714) 
107.760** 
(46.186) 
( ): standard errors. ***statistically significant at the 1%, **5% and *10% levels 
Source. Author 
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Table 5. Links between financial integration and microfinance performance along the types of 
MFIs 
FI Banks 
 
Cooperatives NBFI NGO Rural Banks 
roa 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
oss -0.336*** 
(0.064) 
-0.499*** 
(0.112) 
0.148*** 
(0.028) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.046 
(0.237) 
aloan_gni -0.012 
(0.009) 
0.274*** 
(0.052) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
0.290 
(0.346) 
lnacbor 0.135*** 
(0.027) 
0.171** 
(0.068) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
-0.124 
(0.131) 
equi 0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.042) 
equi² 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
lnassets 0.123 
(0.108) 
0.304* 
(0.156) 
0.061* 
(0.033) 
-0.068** 
(0.027) 
1.515*** 
(0.490) 
Assets² -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.075*** 
(0.024) 
_cons 3.185*** 
(0.587) 
0.826 
(0.613) 
3.843*** 
(0.174) 
5.006*** 
(0.148) 
-2.691 
(2.365) 
 N=528 
Number of 
groups = 66 
Wald 
chi2(8)=428.04 
Likelihood = - 
2765.508*** 
N=321 
Number of 
groups = 47 
Wald 
chi2(8)=81.34 
Likelihood =  
- 
1429.233*** 
N=1251 
Number of 
groups = 178 
Wald 
chi2(8)=166.89 
Likelihood = - 
6216.843*** 
N=1352 
Number of 
groups = 183 
Wald 
chi2(8)=72.65 
Likelihood = - 
6244.543*** 
N=102 
Number of 
groups = 13 
Wald 
chi2(8)=17.15 
Likelihood = - 
403.289 
( ): standard errors. ***statistically significant at the 1%, **5% and *10% levels 
Source. Author 
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Graph 1. Percentage of borrowings according to the level of financial development 
 
Source. Author 
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Graph 2. Relationship between borrowings and assets 
 
Source. Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
As
se
ts
 
gr
ow
th
 
(ln
a
ss
et
s)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percentage of borrowings
Quantile-Quantile Plot
33 
 
Graph 3. Financial integration pathway 
 
Source. Author 
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Graph 4. Quantile graph relationship between financial integration, financial development, agency 
costs and microfinance performance 
  
 
 Source. Author 
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